Epistemology and the Law: Why There is No Epistemic Mileage in Legal Cases. Philosophical Studies (2020) [Link]
The primary aim of this paper is to defend the Lockean View – the view that a belief is epistemically justified iff it is highly probable – against a new family of objections. According to these objections, broadly speaking, the Lockean View ought to be abandoned because it is incompatible with, or difficult to square with, our judgments surrounding certain legal cases. I distinguish and explore three different versions of these objections – The Conviction Argument, the Argument from Assertion and Practical Reasoning, and the Comparative Probabilities Argument – but argue that none of them are successful. I also present some very general reasons for being pessimistic about the overall strategy of using legal considerations to evaluate epistemic theories; as we will see, there are good reasons to think that many of the considerations relevant to legal theorizing are ultimately irrelevant to epistemic theorizing.
Normalcy, Justification, and the Easy-Defeat Problem. Philosophical Studies (2019) [Link]
Recent years have seen the rise of a new family of non-probabilistic accounts of epistemic justification. According to these views – we may call them Normalcy Views – a belief in P is justified only if, given the evidence, there exists no normal world in which S falsely believes that P. This paper aims to raise some trouble for this new approach to justification by arguing that Normalcy Views, while initially attractive, give rise to problematic accounts of epistemic defeat. As we will see, on Normalcy Views seemingly insignificant pieces of evidence turn out to have considerable defeating powers. This problem – I will call it the Easy-Defeat Problem – gives rise to a two-pronged challenge. First, it shows that the Normalcy View has counterintuitive implications and, second, it opens the door to an uncomfortable skeptical threat.
A Bitter Pill for Closure. Synthese (2019) [Link]
The primary objective of this paper is to introduce a new epistemic paradox that puts pressure on the claim that justification is closed under multi premise deduction. The first part of the paper will consider two well-known paradoxes – the lottery and the preface paradox – and outline two popular strategies for solving the paradoxes without denying closure. The second part will introduce a new, structurally related, paradox that is immune to these closure-preserving solutions. I will call this paradox, The Paradox of the Pill. Seeing that the prominent closure-preserving solutions do not apply to the new paradox, I will argue that it presents a much stronger case against the claim that justification is closed under deduction than its two predecessors. Besides presenting a more robust counterexample to closure, the new paradox also reveals that the strategies that were previously thought to get closure out of trouble are not sufficiently general to achieve this task as they fail to apply to similar closure-threatening paradoxes in the same vicinity.
Work in Progress
Title Redacted. (Under Review)
This paper elaborates and defends a novel pluralist theory of epistemic justification that combines two competing views in the literature: probabilistic and non-probabilistic accounts of justification. I show that neither probabilistic nor non-probabilistic accounts of justification alone are wholly satisfactory and argue that on a pluralist conception of justification we can avoid the central problems faced by monist views.
Title Redacted. (Under Review)
This paper considers but rejects one of the main arguments in support of the claim that groups can have genuine beliefs: The Argument From Interpretationism. In particular, I argue that the interpretationist strategy – originally formulated with individual subjects in mind – cannot be straightforwardly applied to plural subjects (e.g. groups and collectives) and show how different types of rejectionists may respond to the argument. In showing why the Argument From Interpretationism fails, the paper also brings into focus some more general constraints on the scope and applicability of interpretationism.
The Epistemology of Promising (In Progress)
This paper explores whether there is an epistemic constraint on what we can sincerely promise to others. To gain traction on this question, I consider cases of promising against the evidence – i.e. cases in which we make a seemingly sincere promise knowing full well that there is a good chance that we’ll be unable to keep it (e.g. the promise that one will quit smoking). I consider but reject a number of extant proposals for how to deal with these cases. I then argue that given the social role that promising plays, there is no reason to think that promising should be epistemically constrained.